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From Parameters, Spring 1999, pp. 2-24.
"When the hour of crisis comes, remember that 40 selected men can shake the world." -- Yasotay (Mongol
warlord)[1]

The frequently quoted words of Yasotay penetrate to the core of the strategic utility of special operations forces. That
utility reposes most essentially in two qualities, economy of force and expansion of strategic choice.[2] In the most
general of terms, special operations forces (SOF) offer the prospect of a favorably disproportionate return on military
investment. Moreover, SOF provide the possibility of a range of precisely conducted military activities more extensive
than that reliably feasible for regular warriors conducting regular operations.[3] Whether or not SOF--or others
nominally competent to carry out special operations--can fulfill the strategic promise just suggested may be analyzed
usefully in terms of a historically based assessment of conditions for success and failure: that is the mission for this
article.
It is tempting to label conditions either as necessary or desirable, but so diverse is the legacy of special operations that
such classification exceeds the bounds of confident judgment. One can neither specify conditions that guarantee
success nor identify the circumstances that guarantee failure. Given the variety of ways in which special operations can
achieve positive strategic results, it is clear that the definition of success for special operations is not straightforward.
Tactical failure at the right time, in the right way, and for the right reasons can amount to strategic success (it might
lift popular morale or impress the foe and allies).[4] Findings on the conditions for the success or failure of special
operations cannot sensibly be presented as a formula, a kind of strategist's cookbook. The conditions for success
identified here simply point to historical factors that increase the prospects for achievement of significant strategic
effect.
The opportunity to extract strategic utility has to depend on opportunities presented by the enemy. Enemy vulnerability
is critical for the success of special operations. The performance required of friendly forces alters dramatically with the
competence of the foe. All enemies are vulnerable, but some are more vulnerable than others. Nonetheless, not all
vulnerabilities lend themselves to useful exploitation.
In sum, first, many of the conditions for success discussed in this article are interdependent. Second, the relevance,
certainly the precise meaning, of these conditions varies with individual cases. Third, some substitution is possible
among conditions. Fourth, special operations can succeed even against the odds, when supposedly important conditions
appear far from permissive: virtually by definition, special operations tend to affront conventional standards of
conditions for military success. Finally, specific historical contexts must determine how great, or limited, can be the
strategic utility of special operations.
Conditions for Success
The conditions for success are grouped in the categories summarized in Figure 1. Each will be discussed in turn.
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Figure 1. Conditions for Success

Policy Demand: Suitability for the Age
SOF need to meet the distinctive policy demands of each era. SOF are useful in all kinds of conflicts. Nonetheless,
the policy demand for their strategic services varies from decade to decade. Notwithstanding the experience of Desert
Storm in 1991, US policy today places demands upon SOF principally in the region of low-intensity conflict.[5] Just as
the redesign of US grand strategy and defense policy reflects changes in international security conditions, the course of
events as interpreted by policymakers shapes demand for the services of SOF.
The crafting of special operations capabilities to meet policy demand applies to all levels of conflict.
SOF need to change with the diminishing availability of conventional military options. As the United States
downsizes its military forces, so the scope for SOF success (and failure) could expand. The mixture of regional
instability, continuing US interest in international order, and a reduced scale of conventional forces suggests an
increase in the use of SOF.[6] SOF can be thought of as another kind of precision force to that being prepared through
exploitation of new information technologies.
This claim refers most specifically to mid-intensity conflict, since the reduction in the armed forces trained for regular
warfare has little or no effect upon demand for SOF in low-intensity conflict. (With respect to terminology, SOF are
regular troops trained to fight irregularly.)
Politics
SOF need permissive domestic conditions, a tolerant political and strategic structure. Attitudes toward irregular
warfare, toward the particular foes in that warfare, and toward the ability of the government to employ SOF
capabilities in socially acceptable ways are subject to change. Some of the qualities of SOF that appeal to politicians-low investment but potentially high political return, deniability, and flexibility--include qualities that some critics find
troubling. To illustrate: consider the contrast among the British, French, Israeli, and US political systems and cultures
vis-à-vis special operations. Whether due to brutal cynicism or sophisticated appreciation of the needs of realpolitik,
French or Israeli special operations have to become major sources of public embarrassment before they attract much
negative comment at home. By way of contrast, when Britain's SAS shot IRA terrorists in Gibraltar in March 1988,
there was a domestic outcry couched substantially in ethical terms. One can just imagine the domestic furor that would
ensue were US SOF truly unleashed in peacetime to wage war properly on the foreign enemies of American society.
Despite a long and sometimes distinguished history in irregular warfare,[7] the United States in this century has been a
difficult home for the development of SOF. For different reasons, neither the United States nor Germany in World War
II was culturally friendly toward SOF. Britain and the Soviet Union, by contrast, had cultures that fostered a strategic
approach to SOF. In the United States, the American way of war has not accommodated SOF as an important strategic
instrument.[8] The US Army is heir to the proud Jominian tradition of applying overwhelming force at the decisive
point.[9] That tradition, as interpreted and applied, has difficulty finding useful roles for SOF.
T. E. Lawrence in Arabia in 1916-18, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the Kachin hills of Burma in 1944, and
the SAS in Borneo in 1964-66 all came to terms with local mores. The tolerance of local political culture, whether

foreign or for the SOF at home, depends in part upon how well SOF activities are crafted and explained with regard to
popular beliefs and cultural symbols. US ability to use SOF to their full potential requires that their operations express
the dominant American idea of civic virtue, and (probably) that they recreate the persona of the frontiersman.[10]
The need for an accommodating political and strategic culture applies to special operations across the board of
operational possibilities. However, the higher the intensity level of conflict, the stronger the resistance to a strategic
view of SOF. The American way of war barely addresses low-intensity conflict,[11] which helps explain the poorly
organized US opposition to SOF at that level of war. Cultural empathy is necessary if SOF are to work effectively with
allies.
SOF need an educated consumer, political and military patrons who appreciate what SOF should, and should not,
be asked to do. Strong patrons for SOF are like gift horses, and they tend to be welcomed and humored regardless of
their grasp of military realities. Particular peril derives from the fact that a sponsor's view of special operations, indeed
of war generally, coalesces during his or her formative years, no matter how relevant that period to the current context.
Winston Churchill, who was critical to the formation of the British Commandos in 1940, had an approach to war
shaped by his experience of the Boer War (1899-1902).[12] Indeed, the title "commando" derived from the Boer way
of war in that conflict. In addition, Churchill's unrealistic popular beliefs in the 1930s about the value of a civilian, or
paramilitary, "fifth column" (with reference to Franco's drive on Madrid in the Spanish Civil War) influenced
expectations of the Special Operations Executive (SOE).
In Nazi Germany, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and the Abwehr controlled the Brandenburger special forces. His political
weakness, however, and the relative isolation of the Abwehr both from the mainstream of authority in the army and
increasingly from Hitler, helped to condemn the Brandenburgers to minor roles and even to outright misuse. After
1943, Otto Skorzeny's SS commandos filled the vacuum left by the fading of Canaris's special forces. Overall,
however, German army SOF were frustrated by culture and historical context. A continental power bent upon the
achievement of rapid and decisive victories by main force is not a power likely to find great strategic utility in SOF.
Canaris's Brandenburger special forces were true to the strategic culture of Germany when they were abandoned to the
elite division of the army, the Grossdeutschland.
With Churchill's patronage, the British Commandos operated under the newly created Combined Operations
Directorate and, in effect, were a separate service. Churchill's sponsorship of Orde Wingate for his proposal to insert
columns (of "Chindits") into the Japanese rear in Burma, thinking that he might repeat Lawrence of Arabia's exploits
in the First World War, and Field-Marshal Claude Auchinleck's backing of David Stirling and his SAS idea, are
further examples of successful patronage. For the United States, President Franklin Roosevelt's support of "Wild Bill"
Donovan was necessary for the creation and success of the OSS, while--in a later era--President Kennedy's patronage
was important for the status and employment of US SOF. The fate of SOF when they lose their patron can be bleak.
Following the assassination of President Diem in November 1963, South Vietnam's SOF (LLDB--Luc Luong Du Biet)
descended from the status of political favorite to a backwater under successor regimes.
Because of ignorance, lack of strategic grasp, or plain ill will, SOF can find themselves misused as shock troops (they
are elite warriors, after all--the trouble is that they are few in number), dispatched on forlorn hopes, or wasted on
missions that make no strategic sense, even if tactically feasible. The assignment of the US Army's Green Berets to
border protection in South Vietnam at the end of 1963 was a classic misuse of the unique talents of SOF. To be fair to
political and military patrons, there have been cases when elements of SOF have been more concerned to play than
they have been to play effectively via whole team effort. For example, Operation Urgent Fury in October 1983
demonstrated that US SOF were committed to play their parts in the liberation of Grenada, whether or not those parts
fitted together usefully for coherent strategic effect.
Among the major powers one can rank the national acceptance of special operations. In descending order, the rankings
are: Israel, the former Soviet Union, Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. (Among minor powers--in these
cases now lapsed--historians of special operations need to register the strategic excellence of the SOF of the Republic
of South Africa under the former regime and of Rhodesia.[13]) Even of the relatively benign environment of the
British military establishment, an author can write that "there is also in the higher echelons of the British Army [of the
early 1980s] a traditional skepticism about `funnies.'"[14] As for the United States, in the words of Alfred H. Paddock,

Jr.: "The manner in which psychological and unconventional warfare evolved from 1941 until their union as a formal
Army capability in 1952 suggests a theme that runs throughout the history of special warfare: the story of a hesitant
and reluctant Army attempting to cope with concepts and organizations of an unconventional nature."[15]
The need for strategically educated sponsors of special operations applies to conflicts at all levels of intensity. At the
high end of warfare, commanders may assign SOF to wholly inappropriate combat roles, while at the low end they
may be thrown at a problem area that really calls for police work.
For US SOF to fulfill their strategic potential, they must have sponsors in the unified commands, in the military
service and central civilian bureaucracies, and in the White House and the Congress. There is much to be said in favor
of the education of the military establishment as a whole about the limited but important roles for SOF. Since
education can be a long and uncertain enterprise, and one that is unlikely to register complete victory over ignorance
and prejudice, wise SOF recognize the need for politically powerful protection. Unsurprisingly, politicians often have a
grasp of the strategic application of SOF superior to that achieved by the regular military minds and institutions of
professional regular soldiers. For example, this certainly was the case with respect to the deployment of the SAS to
Northern Ireland in 1976-77, and the unenthusiastic response of regular minds at British army headquarters in the
province to that political decision.[16]
SOF need a politically legitimate mission. Special operations are more likely to generate strategic utility when the
mission they support has political legitimacy. Both domestic and international conceptions of political legitimacy
determine the viability of policy. In many cases, political legitimacy is not a problem: for radically different examples,
one can cite World War II and the Iranian hostage rescue attempt of 1980. Indeed, political legitimacy lends
respectability to a modus operandi for irregular warfare which otherwise could raise legal and moral questions. The
American public was suitably politically receptive to claims for the political legitimacy of the Grenadan intervention in
1983, as well as for the action in Panama in 1989. If the political legitimacy of a mission is doubtful or contested,
however, the political sensitivity of special operations increases. For example, in Malaya in the 1950s and in Borneo in
the 1960s, Britain had to maintain firm political control of special operations. Also, it is the case that special operations
can suffer castigation, or acquire accolades, by association with policies that are less, or more, politically legitimate.
For example, the OSS benefited from being an instrument of US strategy in "The Good War" that was World War II,
while the reputation of US Green Berets in Vietnam suffered when a politically significant portion of American
society came to regard Vietnam as not being a "good war."
This condition is especially critical with respect to low-intensity conflict--though both Korea and Vietnam showed that
even wars of mid-level intensity can trigger a political controversy that hinders the strategic effectiveness of military
effort.
SOF need an attractive political message for the recruitment of local allies. To recruit local auxiliaries for guerrilla
or counterguerrilla operations, it is essential to have an attractive political program (of course, economic incentives
might suffice). In World War II, for example, SOE and OSS were in the business of liberating captive peoples by
supporting local resistance movements, albeit for the strategic goals of Britain and the United States. Nonetheless, the
political message had to fit the local strategic context. In Malaya in the 1950s, and in Borneo (Malaysia) in the 1960s,
British special operations could be portrayed convincingly and truthfully as directed toward the political independence
and security of a local client. Both France and the United States failed to provide this quality of positive political
clothing necessary for the strategically effective conduct of special operations in Southeast Asia.
By way of contrast with the British situation in Malaya and Borneo, the French in Algeria based their conduct of the
war against the FLN upon an unsound political premise.[17] All the French army could offer was Algérie française--a
slogan unappealing to most of the indigenous population. The French army had learned a great deal about la guerre
revolutionaire in Indochina.[18] But successful counterrevolutionary war is not really a matter of military, or even
paramilitary, technique. The fundamental problem in Algeria was that France lacked a political cause adequate to bear
the weight of war. The US political situation in Vietnam was somewhat better than the French dilemma in Algeria,
though the military problems in Southeast Asia were more severe.[19] Ultimately, however, the United States too
failed to advance a political story with sufficient local appeal.

This condition applies rigorously in cases of low-intensity conflict, while it can be relevant also in contexts of midand even high-intensity conflict when the recruitment of local auxiliaries, or the encouragement of local resistance, is
desirable.
SOF can benefit from a positive political message for the enemy. Special operations in political and psychological
warfare require a message that the enemy finds attractive if he is to be turned from a current political allegiance. Both
the Germans and the Western Allies in World War II failed to provide conditions wherein political warfare could
succeed. The abhorrent racial theory which underpinned Hitler's state guaranteed that Nazi political warfare would fail
among non-Germanic peoples. The Third Reich was too stupid politically even to pretend to offer benefits to non"Aryans." In 1941 there was ample evidence of the willingness of many of the Soviet peoples to give the
invader/liberator the benefit of the doubt--if only the Germans had shown a modicum of political intelligence. On the
Allied side, the demand for unconditional surrender specified at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 meant that
any internal revolt against the Third Reich could have no hope of thereby saving the country from total defeat.
Whenever special operations aim to influence the minds of enemy personnel in the hope of changing their behavior,
this condition must apply.
SOF need support from regular military forces generally judged likely to win. It is a ubiquitous and perennial human
phenomenon to rush to the aid of the victor, but only to shuffle hesitantly to the aid of the probable victor.
Notwithstanding some heroic exceptions, the general record of World War II, for example, shows a dramatic
correlation between Allied military superiority or the physical proximity of Allied military power and the willingness
of local populations to resist German or Italian occupation. France is a classic example. Active French resistance to
German occupation escalated from insignificant to widespread open revolt between the summer of 1940 and June
1944. The people of France were sensible. From the American Revolution to Vietnam, a "bandwagon effect" functions
as people hasten to join the winning side.
For SOF to be effective in circumstances where they need to work with civilians at immediate risk to the enemy, it is
essential that the locals believe both that our side will be the inevitable victor and that they, the locals, will be on the
winning side.
Feasible Objectives
SOF need objectives that they can secure without the aid of regular units. It is difficult for SOF to succeed tactically,
or achieve strategic utility, when commanders commit them to combat situations for which they are not suited. French
paratroops at Dien Bien Phu and US Army Green Berets along the border in South Vietnam (to control infiltration),
are examples of the misuse of elite light infantry and SOF.[20] The dilemma is particularly acute for airborne, ranger,
and marine raiding units. German paratroopers on Crete in 1941, US Rangers in Italy in 1943, and British Chindits in
Burma in 1944 all tested or extended the limits of commitment to feasible objectives.[21] So rich is the variety of
special and special-purpose units around the world that generalization can be perilous. The point simply is that SOF,
and especially SOF that evolve into large-scale raiding units, are apt to be misused by commanders.
This condition applies particularly to high- and mid-intensity conflict, but even in low-intensity contexts an enemy
concentration easily can overwhelm SOF.
Special operations need to be conducted at the right time. The timing of special operations affects both their tactical
feasibility and their strategic merit. The British Commando raid upon the docks at St. Nazaire in March 1942, for
example, was tactically feasible, but not strategically useful, because Hitler had no intention of risking his remaining
large surface vessels in the Atlantic in 1942.
Timing is a factor in all manner of conflicts and requires a quality of judgment that easily falls short.[22]
SOF need protection from the fantasies of political sponsors. Both Winston Churchill in 1940-41 and President
Lyndon Johnson in the mid-1960s harbored unrealistic expectations for the utility of SOF. Johnson believed that light
cross-border raiding could reduce Hanoi's will to fight on. Moreover, he hoped to achieve momentous results cheaply
and quietly.

The fantasies of political sponsors have no limits. The solution is a better-educated patron.
Decisionmakers must consult special operations experts before deciding upon missions. Viewed tactically, "special
warfare is an esoteric art unto itself."[23] SOF perform most successfully when people who understand special warfare
select and plan operations. This is a matter of degree, not of absolutes. The abortive Iranian rescue mission of 1980,
though planned competently in its several pieces, was subject to distinctive phase-related command and control which
affronted the gods of special operations tradecraft, while some of the ways in which the Americans used Green Berets
in Southeast Asia after the early 1960s amounted to waste of a scarce excellent asset. By way of contrast, SEAL
operations in the Mekong Delta provide a near perfect example of the proper employment of SOF. In the SEAL case,
the SOF themselves largely determined what they attempted, and how.
This is a general truth applicable to all special operations in all strategic contexts.
Strategy
SOF need a high command that possesses a strategic mentality. A high command that is unable to function
strategically is unlikely to appreciate the strategic value of SOF. A country's high command which fixates upon battles
and campaigns neglects the realm of strategy. Moreover, even a country that remembers strategy may still neglect to
fight in ways that promote the political objectives of the war.
If one is not to waste tactical successes, they must occur within the context of a strategy appropriate to political
victory. For example, the US government misassessed the character and structure of the war in Vietnam, and therefore
could not--except by accident--implement plans at all likely to achieve the goals specified. As a consequence, planners
vastly overestimated Hanoi's willingness to tolerate Chinese intervention in the war, and therefore were needlessly
tentative toward the use of US or allied military power in the North.
Special operations must occur within the framework of strategic purpose if they are to have positive strategic utility.
Except for those rare cases when a special operation is the conflict--e.g., a rescue mission or a punitive raid in
peacetime--the strategic value of SOF is always hostage to the strategic quality of its political and military masters.
SOF benefit from a supportive strategic context, particularly one in which regular forces need assistance. British
Commandos and US Rangers (50 of them, fighting with the British) performed well at Dieppe in 1942, but the attrition
suffered by the regular Anglo-Canadian forces was so rapid and substantial that the SOF contribution translated as a
competent contribution to a tactical disaster. Notwithstanding the general truth that special operations can accelerate
success and slow the pace of defeat, truly beaten troops are beyond the help of SOF; conversely, successful troops will
not greatly benefit from SOF assistance. In August-September 1944, for example, the speed of the Allied advance
negated the need for intervention by airborne forces, resulting in the cancellation of a series of proposed operations.
Neither armies in dire straits, nor armies in the flush of victory, can benefit very much strategically from special
operations.
In the Central Pacific drive of the Pacific War, the United States found little need for SOF capabilities (though this
was not the case for Douglas MacArthur's drive in the Southwest Pacific theater, from New Guinea to--especially--the
Philippines). Once the balance of materiel had shifted decisively in the US favor in the second half of 1943, the very
character of the maritime theater of operations itself fulfilled some critical special operations functions. The anchoring
of the defense of Japan's maritime flank upon island fortresses which could not support each other, backed up by an
Imperial Combined Fleet inadequate to its mission, meant that even strategic and operational deception could be
attempted on a grand scale by the United States. The Japanese were confused as to the principal direction of the Allied
threat--as well they might be[24]--and as to the identity of precise insular targets. The US Navy could either bypass
isolated Japanese island fortresses or take them reliably, if expensively, by brute force. Beyond the valuable services of
the UDT's (underwater demolition teams),[25] US commanders saw little need for special operations assistance in the
Central Pacific drive toward Japan's home islands.
The type of conflict and its course are critical to the applicability of this condition. In low-intensity conflict, brief
raids, or other isolated special operations, the condition of the regular forces will matter either not at all or only

minimally.
SOF need a political-military framework into which they can fit. Prior to the US Civil War, special operations was
an--if not the--American way of war, notwithstanding the frequently unduly "regular" way in which "hostiles" were
pursued on the frontier. Since 1865, however, only the quite recent revival of serious strategic commitment to the
problems of low-intensity conflict in the Third World has provided a "way of war," a framework, into which special
operations and SOF fit naturally.[26] The British army has had a tradition of peripheral raiding (in the Seven Years
War, 1756-63, for example), and it was to a degree captivated by the legend of Lawrence of Arabia. Also, British
colonial and even post-colonial Third World experience kept a tradition of irregular warfare alive.[27] Germany had
experience with unconventional warfare in 1914-18 in her beleaguered colony of Tanganyika.[28] However, the
"special operations" that caught the German popular and military professional attention were not the irregular tactics of
Lettow-Vorbeck in East Africa, but rather the infiltration attacks by shock troops (not SOF) at Caporetto, and in the
Kaiserschlacht of 1918. German feelings about guerrilla warfare in Europe were dominated by the bitter memory of
the franc tireurs of 1870-71.[29] Overall, Germany, like the United States, has had no recent framework of war into
which SOF easily could fit.
By firsthand experience, the example of others, or through study, a military establishment can educate itself to the
strategic merit in SOF.
SOF need a stable overall war strategy to which they can contribute. This was a fatal weakness in the French
attempt to gain strategic value from SOF in Indochina. One can argue whether or not instability in strategy is more
harmful than absence of strategy. Although shifting strategies can deny special operations an opportunity to succeed, a
readiness to alter strategy can be a positive sign of flexibility. Game plans may need to be rewritten in real-time. None
of the eventual participants entered World War II with careful preparation for the use of SOF. Britain, by far the most
liberal of combatants toward the creation and employment of SOF, literally had to invent a special operations
capability in the summer of 1940. As the game plan for victory in the war as a whole was rewritten in response to
events (in this case, the defeat of regular forces in May-June 1940), so new capabilities were added.
Whether SOF constitute the strategy, or whether they play a team role, they need direction by a coherent theory of
victory.
Flexibility of Mind
SOF need the ability to support regular military operations, as well as to perform independently. Every level of
command prefers to withhold SOF for use at its particular level of war--political, strategic, operational, tactical. The
SAS and SBS (Special Boat Service of the Royal Marine Commandos) in the Falklands War of 1982 illustrate this
point in all aspects. British SOF functioned at all levels of this conflict, but the ground force commander regarded them
as something of a "loose cannon on a rolling deck." The independent lines of communication from the SAS in the field
to its regimental headquarters in Hereford, to Task Force headquarters outside London (Northwood), and even to the
Prime Minister's office, did not make for close working relations in the South Atlantic.[30] The US experience in
Vietnam, particularly with its cumbersome, even bizarre, command arrangements, did not support a desirable
flexibility toward SOF employment. The challenge is for policymakers, regular military commanders, and SOF leaders
to be willing to consider a range of missions.
Decisionmakers require open and flexible, yet educated and disciplined minds in order to comprehend the range of
SOF options in conflicts of all kinds.
SOF should not be doctrinaire. Beyond the tactical "tradecraft," and appropriate, if unremarkable, general wisdom
(e.g., do not alienate a native population from which you need to find recruits), SOF must approach each conflict with
a distinctive theory of victory; there should be no formulae specifying what ought to work.[31] The successful conduct
of unconventional warfare requires a state of mind that can innovate nonstandard solutions to problems. The British
SAS has demonstrated the enviable ability to reinvent itself from challenge to challenge as British security, and SAS
organizational, interests require.
Skill in the tactical tradecraft of special operations--let alone the talismanic wearing of distinctively colored berets and

formal designation as "special" units--does not necessarily amount to true special operations capability. Rather than
assigning the operational tasks of SOF to fit a traditional understanding of SOF capabilities, it is important that flexible
SOF be tailored to novel operational tasks. One cannot demonstrate that special operations might have been conducted-and to what strategic effect--in particular conflicts, but it is probable that SOF are underexploited. Neither the special
warriors themselves, nor their political and military sponsors, would appear to press SOF close to the limits of their
strategic potential.
Unconventional warfare of all kinds and in all circumstances needs direction by unconventional minds.
SOF need to exploit surprise. Surprise is critical for the tactical success of special operations, while "surprise effect,"
or the effect of surprise, can define the strategic utility of such operations. Politically expressive special operations
rapidly lose their strategic value if SOF repeat them formulaically. For example, British Commandos in 1940-42 and
Israeli SOF in the War of Attrition in 1968-69 unimaginatively repeated previous activities. People rapidly redefine
what were once shocking surprises as regular occurrences. From the perspective of substate terrorist groups, the first
few aircraft hijackings or bombs in shopping centers transmit an alarming message. Repetition of these missions,
however, reveals minds lacking in either imagination or strategy.
Surprise is critical for tactical success, and surprise effect is vital for strategic utility, in special operations of all kinds
and in all circumstances. Surprise effect is the answer to the quintessential question of the strategist, "So what?" The
commander of SEAL Team Six, Captain William H. McRaven, advises wisely that "special operations forces do not
generally have the luxury of attacking the enemy when or where he is unprepared. Such forces must attack in spite of
enemy preparation. Surprise means catching the enemy off guard."[32] In other words, SOF typically must be content
to strive to achieve only tactical surprise, because operational and strategic surprise often will be unattainable.
Absence of Alternatives
SOF prosper when conventional operations are prohibited by political factors, ruled out as too expensive, or
otherwise are deemed inappropriate. As a general rule, the Israeli government has denied the Israeli Defense Forces
permission to violate borders and wreak damage upon Israel's foes in regular ways (and even when they were so
licensed, the results have not always been those expected--e.g. Lebanon in 1982). Special operations have been
politically mandated as the only type of permissible military action. In Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the 1960s,
Washington prohibited taking the ground war to the enemy in the North or in other sanctuaries (Laos and Cambodia),
resulting in SOF being, by default, the leading instrument of choice. In the "confrontation" with Indonesia in 1964-66,
Britain resorted to stealthy, precise, and low-profile special operations to win the war in the jungle. London was
adamant against initiating large-scale initiatives against Indonesia.[33] Harold Wilson's Labour government strove
both to maintain conventional deterrence of major escalation by Indonesia and to deny Jakarta the evidence of British
provocative acts that might require Indonesia to escalate in order to save face.
Conflicts on all scales and of all kinds can provide unattractive conditions for the use of regular forces, so that special
operations are promoted to be the instrument of choice. Conventional action may promise a Pyrrhic victory, if victory
at all, or simply may lack the reach and agility to do the job.
Special operations prosper in conflicts suited to the skills of SOF. There are conflicts for which large-scale
conventional operations are all but irrelevant because the enemy lacks vulnerability to such actions. Although SOF can
play useful roles in virtually all conflicts at all levels, there are particular challenges to which conventional forces,
functioning conventionally, can provide no answers. These are the conflicts one will lose if a special operations
mentality does not guide the principal thrust of one's efforts. Examples abound but must include the French and
American wars in Indochina, the emergencies in Malaya and Borneo involving the British, and most antiterrorist and
some anti-drug-trafficking operations. (This is not to deny that opposition to terrorists can, and sometimes should, take
the form of conventional threats and punitive action against their sponsors.)
This somewhat circular point--special operations will be demanded when the prowess of SOF is at a premium--does
not contradict the earlier claim that the absolute value of special operations to the country may be the greatest in midand high-intensity conflicts. The relative strategic value of special operations will be at its highest in those contexts
wherein SOF provide a unique effectiveness, which is to say in low-intensity conflicts, and in coups de main

(including raids).[34]
SOF prosper in a strategic context of diminished conventional options. Just as nations sometimes conduct special
operations as an expedient pending the readiness of large-scale conventional forces, so radical peacetime reductions in
conventional forces should increase interest in the strategic value of SOF. If there is merit in the old saying that
necessity is the mother of invention, then a relative poverty in brute-force options should encourage a country to "plan
and act smarter." Of course, an America convinced that it will enjoy "dominant battlespace knowledge" for the nearimmaculate conduct of precise, information-led, "networked," conventional war for the next half century or so may
well be an America underpersuaded of the cost-effectiveness of irregular operations.[35]
Enemy Vulnerabilities
SOF need an enemy with exploitable vulnerabilities. A vulnerability is not a vulnerability if it is not exploitable.
Every combatant has vulnerabilities which SOF theoretically could exploit. The reasons why an apparent vulnerability
to SOF attention may be only theoretical, however, include: political guidance prohibiting the relevant kinds of special
operations, lack of technical assets to execute the special operations, or weakness in the conventional forces which
must exploit special operations success.
This condition applies to all kinds of conflicts.
SOF benefit from a stupid enemy unable or unwilling to learn from its mistakes, or unable to reduce its
vulnerabilities. In World War II, the Third Reich could not repress its repulsive, racist nature, despite the German
army's tradition of brutal professional self-criticism. The tactical excellence encouraged by the self-criticism could not
negate the geostrategic conditions that supported special operations by the Grand Alliance. While Germany could not
defend everything, it could ensure that the strategic effect of unpleasant surprises achieved by Allied special operations
would be in the tolerable range.
The ability of the enemy to learn from its own or others' mistakes is relevant to the strategic utility of special
operations in all conflicts. In every case, however, there are limits to the degree to which combatants can protect their
war effort from special operations.
SOF fare well when they can turn an enemy's strength into a weakness. The state of economic, social, and political
development of a country has a significant bearing upon its vulnerability to special operations of all kinds (including
political or psychological warfare). The growth of industrial society in the last century both expanded the potential
scope for special operations, while--for a period--denying useful targets. Both the ethos of the period (notions of
gentlemanly conduct, which lingered on in the US Army into World War II), and the sheer distribution of value among
the products of industrial-age warfare, helped eclipse the special operations mentality. To risk exaggeration, the great
contending coalitions of 1914-18 were virtually "special operations-proof" in Europe. The political warfare to which
all parties eventually resorted was selectively effective only over the long haul of three and four years of war.[36] The
contrast between the two world wars could hardly be more stark. Sir Douglas Haig did not fear for his safety from
German commandos (the Germans had no commandos in that war, at least none that Otto Skorzeny would have
recognized).[37] As our society pursues goals with little concern for the risk of malevolent action, so vulnerability to
special operations can increase. The centralization and interdependencies that characterize modern society are features
that attract the SOF planner and the terrorist--people who, to a notable degree, share skills and tactical outlook.[38]
In all classes of conflict, it is highly desirable to design special operations so that they turn enemy strength into
weakness.
SOF can benefit from an oppressive enemy. It is difficult to operate in your opponent's territory if the population is
sympathetic to the enemy.[39] Given the power of national feelings over ideology, religion, or other belief systems, the
relationship between an enemy state and its people in the operational theater usually defines the limits of special
operations. Because an oppressive enemy will generate opposition to its rule, it follows that it is usually in our interest
if the enemy is oppressive. Caveats include the considerations that enemy oppression may be so effective that it
crushes local resistance, while SOF reconnaissance missions benefit from a quiet environment. Also, there is the moral
consideration that the pursuit of our strategic interests may exacerbate oppression. In World War II the Germans

functioned as a highly oppressive occupying force. Even in Asia, where the Japanese Empire initially appealed with
some success to anticolonial and racial sentiment, the Co-Prosperity Sphere rapidly revealed itself as colonialism by
another name. In Southeast Asia in the 1960s, the United States faced an oppressive enemy, but the circumstances of
that complex war did not allow for effective and lasting exploitation of that fact.
This condition applies strictly to the conduct of unconventional warfare in the enemy's rear.
SOF need a substantial and accessible enemy rear area in which to operate. Occupation of foreign territory
increases an enemy's vulnerability to a wide range of special operations. The acquisition of territory and subject
peoples is a two-edged sword. While the German territorial gains of World War II provided economic benefit, they
also set the stage for the Allied conduct of special operations.
Since the enemy generally has a rear area or hinterland, it is useful to note the possible opportunities for special
operations opened by an enemy's territorial conquests.
Technological Assistance
SOF need every advantage that technology can provide. Strategic utility rests upon tactical feasibility, and tactical
feasibility for handfuls of heroes who are hugely outnumbered requires technical assistance. Even minor deficiencies in
equipment can have disproportionately large negative consequences for SOF who, virtually by definition, are acting at
the edge of the envelope of military feasibility.
The lack of good roads before the 19th century--and later, in Eastern Europe--inhibited the rapid movement essential
to deep insertion and extraction of SOF. The availability of aircraft, particularly helicopters, presented new options for
employing those forces. Sealed roads, railroads, and aircraft do, of course, assist both sides in conflict. But on balance,
modern means of transport assist SOF more than defending forces because the special warriors should be functioning
stealthily, with the initiative, and therefore should be able to exploit the benefit of tactical surprise.
The novel availability of demolition-quality munitions in the third quarter of the 19th century also had positive
implications for special operations (when political-military conditions again proved permissive of such operations).
The invention of plastic explosives in Britain just before World War II greatly assisted sabotage in that conflict.
Similarly, the introduction of fairly reliable portable radios improved distant cooperation and allowed command and
control of deployed SOF that was not previously possible. Wingate's Chindit operations in 1943 and 1944 were built
upon radio communication and air support including, in 1944, aerial insertion of units.[40]
The lack of large numbers of suitable aircraft contributed to the military failure of the French campaign in Indochina.
Geographical conditions were somewhat friendlier in Algeria, where the availability of helicopters helped the French
design effective tactics against the FLN, at least in the rural dimension of the struggle. French strategy and politics in
that conflict are another matter entirely.
Tactical Competence
Only SOF skilled in their trade should conduct special operations. As a rule, tactical competence is fundamental for
strategic utility. The extensive history of special operations in modern strategy repeatedly identifies the tactical
qualities critical for success. Specifically, special operations need:
a simple chain of operational command
to be planned and executed in ways that are agile, flexible, and versatile
excellent leadership qualities, initiative, and resourcefulness in all ranks[41]
timely and accurate intelligence on mission targets
secrecy, so as to preserve the tactical surprise mandated for operations that typically will be selfcontained
highly trained and suitably equipped personnel
simple, fault-tolerant plans
plans by some of the same people who will lead the missions

to be coordinated carefully with supporting arms, consistent with the need for security[42]
The importance of tactical competence is so obvious that it requires no particular emphasis. Special operations will
rarely be masterpieces in all respects. Among the enabling factors, the errors of the enemy, one hopes, can compensate
for some deficiencies on our side. Also, tactical excellence on the part of SOF may find negative offset in weaknesses
elsewhere in the military establishment. With reference respectively to undue planning time (which translates as a lack
of currency of intelligence), lack of fault-tolerance in planning, and lack of coordination among different SOF
elements and regular forces, one can cite--respectively--the abortive Son Tay POW rescue mission of 1970, Desert
One in 1980, and Grenada in 1983.
Tactical competence is fundamental for the strategic utility of SOF in all conflicts. The probability that a special
operation will fail when its soldiers make mistakes (and lack the skills to correct them), will vary with the relative ease
of securing timely external support. Generally, such timely external support will not be reliably available.
SOF need intensive and comprehensive study of their targets. US SOF prepared for Grenada with maps roughly on a
par for inadequacy with those used by the British in Gallipoli. The contrast between the excellent intelligence available
to French forces in Algeria and the almost always inadequate, or just nonexistent, intelligence available in Indochina
illustrates the point. Special operations cannot succeed without good intelligence; in common with tactical surprise it is
close to constituting an absolutely necessary condition for operational success. The thoroughness with which Soviet
Spetsnaz studied their targets in Western Europe, including travel to actual targets, is the ultimate exemplar of this
point. The excellent tactical intelligence required by SOF often can be provided with requisite confidence only by the
SOF themselves. Whatever one makes of the frequently abominable best-selling novels of Richard Marcinko, his
references to the "sneak and peek" necessities of special warfare ring decidedly true.
Again, this condition is fundamental and ubiquitous for success.
SOF need exceptional human and material assets. By definition it should be true that even in the largest military
establishments, SOF, broadly defined, will not number more than the low thousands (preferably the high hundreds),
and the number usually will be much fewer. It follows that the diversion of money, men, and material to SOF is
modest. The high-risk, small-scale, and frequently self-contained character of special operations means that small
economies in resources tend to have distressingly large consequences at the "sharp end." For example, weaknesses in
radio equipment have been exceedingly hazardous to SOF (witness the SAS experience in the Falklands, where the
risk of detection by Argentinean direction-finding was significant). For an older example, the French faced the
dilemma in Indochina that although they could insert SOF raiding parties deep into Vietminh territory, the absence of
long-range helicopters meant that they could not extract them rapidly (or, generally, at all).
Very small forces engaged in high-risk operations of war cannot afford weak links in people or equipment. The
compensation of additional mass is not available to SOF; quality is key. For SOF, more does not mean better. Resisting
a mindless growth in the size of SOF, in parallel with the no-less-important need to resist inappropriate missions, or
"mission creep," is essential for maintaining the quality of this military instrument.[43]
SOF require coordination with conventional operations, or with the activities of the police. It was a strength of the
Soviet conduct of its war with Germany that they coordinated partisan and Spetsnaz activities with the relevant
"Fronts" and field armies. The finest hour of the SAS and the OSS came in France in June 1944, when raiders, often
working in conjunction with the French Resistance, turned large segments of the German rear into "bandit
country."[44] For negative examples, the French in Indochina demonstrated how not to coordinate regular and
irregular forces, while the United States was bound to fail to coordinate special forces and regular operations in
Vietnam because it lacked both a clear political aim and--necessarily--an overall strategy of victory.
There are few conflicts wherein SOF do not need coordination with either regular military units or the police. In most
cases the quality of cooperation is critical to the outcome of the conflict.
Reputation
It is most desirable that SOF should be feared. A country cannot make a powerful political point with the menace of

discrete action if SOF are incompetent or politically chained. Credibility is the key. That credibility pertains not only
to the tactical skills of the SOF, but also to the political willingness of a government to unleash those warriors in
action.
Deterrence is always uncertain, particularly in cases of low- and mid-intensity conflict, where the inherent credibility
of US action is not substantial. Nonetheless, a reputation for tactical effectiveness in special operations, and for
political willingness to unleash SOF, will maximize the chances for deterrence to work.
History

. Special operations need to be launched at the right time. Strategic utility is a function of historical context as much
as tactical accomplishment. Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), for example, when viewed as special operations,
acquired much of their significance from historical timing. Grenada, notwithstanding the tactical glitches, made a
powerful political statement about the role of the United States in the world. Operation Just Cause in Panama had its
strategic significance much enhanced because of its timing with the dissolution of the Soviet hegemonic empire.
Tactical matters aside, the Panama invasion reminded everyone that there was still a superpower in the world (would
that Saddam Hussein had been paying attention!).
This historical condition does not apply to special operations in high- or mid-intensity conflicts. The relevance of this
claim is for special operations in peacetime.

. Special operations need to be studied as integral to the strategic history of conflict and war. As military history
isolates special operations from mainstream treatment, its study is unlikely to yield knowledge about the strategic
utility of those operations. What special operations and SOF need is better strategic history, not more operational
narratives.[45] The vast literature on special operations does little to advance understanding either of their utility in war
as a whole, or of the conditions that promote their strategic value.[46]

. SOF need to engage the strategic imagination of historians. It is difficult to learn from what did not happen in
history. History is a thoroughly open-ended story of courses of action not taken, and hence of consequences that failed
to ensue, as well as of the unique sequence of events which actually did unfold.[47] History-as-possibility can be
employed as a framework for the generation of special operations might-have-beens. This author is impressed by the
systematic underemployment of SOF in modern strategic history.
Special Operations Forces as a Strategic Asset[48]
Truly it has been said that if you focus upon details, none of your errors will be small. But it is the details which both
point the way to appropriate principles and translate theory into practice. We can identify in a general way the
conditions that favor success in special operations. Ideas about conditions for success, however, require historical
specificity for applicability: type of conflict, character of missions, time, and adversaries. The conditions specified in
this article as tending to promote success in the conduct of special operations can be stated as recommendations for
policy. Special operations forces need:
to fit the demands of policy
a tolerant political and strategic culture
political and military patrons who understand their strategic value
to be assigned feasible objectives
to be directed by a strategically functioning defense establishment
flexibility of mind, and particularly an unconventional mentality
to provide unique strategic services
to find and exploit enemy vulnerabilities
technological assistance
tactical competence (preferably tactical excellence)
a reputation for effectiveness

a willingness to learn from history
These are not trivial conditions, but the potential benefits to national security of a first-class SOF instrument are not
trivial either.
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SOF, but we look in vain for other than casual judgments on the strategic utility of those deeds.
47. Niall Ferguson, ed., Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (London: Picador, 1997), is a landmark.
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